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FOSTERING UNIFORM SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND
RECOVERY-THE DEMISE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN




Punitive damages are awarded by juries to express outrage or
to punish a defendant for flagrant misconduct.' The current move-
ment for statutory tort reform is based, in part, on the belief that
the civil justice mill is out of control, as evidenced by excessive
punitive damage awards. 2 Nevertheless, whether limiting punitive
damage awards will temper the nonsense and avarice surrounding
civil litigation is doubtful.'
t Thomas M. DiBiagio, Adjunct Professor of Admiralty and Maritime Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977); see, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 54 (1983).
2. See Neil A. Lewis, Senate, 61-37 Approves Narrow Punitive Damages Curbs,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at B10 (describing national legislation limiting
punitive damages awards in product liability claims to two times compensatory
damages or $250,000, whichever is greater, and also giving trial judge authority
to increase award above limit and rejecting earlier version which limited punitive
damage award in all civil cases); see also Richard Schmitt, While Congress
Debates, States Limit Civil Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1995, at B1
(discussing legislation in thirty states that seeks to limit punitive damages); Iver
Peterson, Agreement Paves the Way for Liability Law Changes, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1995, at B5 (discussing proposal to change New Jersey state law to
limit punitive damages to $350,000 or five times the compensation awarded
for medical bills and loss of income, whichever is greater).
3. Tort law is concerned with securing justice by providing victims access to, and
a reasonable remedy from, the civil justice system. The debate about whether
punitive damages are an appropriate means of fair compensation is proper.
Unfortunately, reforming the remedy is only one part of the solution. Access
to the civil justice system has been extended and applied in ways that go well
beyond the intended boundaries. Until such time that a paradigm shift occurs
to restrict the unlimited access to the civil justice system, tort law will continue
to be used by lawyers as a means to generate industry profit. See, e.g., Gina
Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty? Researchers Say Bad Science
Won the Day in Breast Implant Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at DI
(describing that, after years of litigation that led to breast implant maker Dow
Corning Corporation's petition for bankruptcy protection, there is no scientific
evidence that implants cause serious disease); Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons,
Millions for Class-Action Lawyers, Script for Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1995, at Dl (describing recent trend in class action suits to construct settlements
that give consumers worthless coupons but that give lawyers millions of dollars
in fees).
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Precluding the recovery of punitive damages in admiralty and
maritime personal injury and death claims has moved well beyond
a fashion statement. Maritime law, unlike the common law of tort,
has not demonstrated a long-standing fidelity to punitive damage
awards. In fact, the two federal maritime statutes applicable to
maritime tort recovery in death claims preclude any award of
punitive damages. 4 In contrast to statutorily-governed recoveries,
however, punitive damages usually have been recoverable in mari-
time personal injury and death claims brought under general, or
common law, maritime law.
Recently, however, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. ,' the Su-
preme Court laid a foundation for the elimination of punitive
damages in general maritime law actions. In Miles, the Court held
that in an action for the wrongful death of a seaman, brought
under general maritime law, recovery should be limited to pecuniary
damages. 6 According to the Court, such a holding was necessary
in order to foster uniformity in substantive law and recovery in
general and statutory admiralty and maritime death actions. 7
Since Miles, lower courts have handed down decisions that
have thoroughly argued both sides of the question of the continued
recoverability of punitive damages under general maritime law.
Cases decided in the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh
4. The two federal legislative remedies are the Jones Act and the Death on the
High Seas Act [hereinafter DOHSAJ. The Jones Act provides a negligence
cause of action to seamen injured or killed in the course of their employment.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). DOHSA provides for both a negligence and an
unseaworihiness cause of action for the death of any person killed on the high
seas (defined as three miles from shore). Id. § 761.
5. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
6. Id. at 32-34.
7. Id. at 33. Pecuniary damages are material or actual losses that are susceptible
to valuation. Pecuniary damages generally consist of funeral expenses, related
medical expenses, pain and suffering inflicted upon the plaintiff (in death cases
pain and suffering inflicted upon the decedent prior to death) and loss of
financial support or services from a dependent beneficiary. Non-pecuniary
damages are more speculative and consist of loss of society, loss of consortium,
loss of companionship, loss of love and affection, loss of comfort, grief and
mental anguish, loss of future income or economic loss and punitive damages.
See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 637 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1998 (1995); Newhouse v. U.S., 844 F. Supp. 1389, 1393
n.2 (D. Nev. 1994); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1093, 1095
(E.D. La. 1992); Howard v. Crystal Cruises, 1992 AMC 1645, 1650 n.2 (E.D.
Cal. 1992); see also Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 453 (D.S.C.
1994) (consortium damages include loss of love and affection, companionship
and society, comfort, aid, advice and solace, rendering of material services and
any other elements that normally arise in a close, intimate and harmonious
marriage relationship); Anderson v. Texaco, 797 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. La.
1992) (punitive damages are non-pecuniary).
Punitive Damages in Admiralty Law
Circuits have held that Miles precludes the recovery of punitive
damages in all maritime personal injury and wrongful death actions
brought under general maritime law.8 In contrast, other cases
decided in the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, al-
though the courts recognized that punitive damages were precluded
under federal maritime statutes, have rejected the notion that Miles
precludes the recovery of punitive damages in unseaworthiness or
negligence-based claims under general maritime law. 9 These courts
have limited Miles to its facts and have carved out exceptions.
The courts that decided not to extend Miles's preclusion of
punitive damages did so in three instances: first, in wrongful death
or survival claims brought under general maritime law arising from
the death of a non-seaman in state territorial waters; second, in
survival claims brought under general maritime law arising from
the death of a non-seaman on the high seas; and, third, in all
personal injury actions brought under general maritime law.
The decisions of these courts, however, are misguided. Miles
does preclude the recovery of punitive damages in maritime personal
injury and death claims.' 0 This preclusion should be extended
beyond the limited facts of Miles because of the disarmingly simple
need to foster uniform substantive law and to eliminate inconsistent
recovery schemes. Miles eliminated the availability of punitive
damages in actions arising out of a seaman's fatal injury. If punitive
damages are no longer available in claims resulting from fatal
injuries to seamen, it follows that these damages should also be
barred in personal injury claims arising from non-fatal injuries to
seamen. Furthermore, if punitive damages are no longer available
in claims arising from the death or injury of a seaman, the
traditional ward of maritime law, it would be incongruous to permit
the recovery of punitive damages in actions arising from the injury
or death of a non-seaman.
Maritime law has not been firmly committed to awarding
punitive damages, but it has demonstrated a fidelity to the ideals
of uniformity and predictability in its substantive law. Miles's
holding was based on the desire to foster an ordered system of
8. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995); Glynn v.
Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995); Wahlstrom v.
Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1994); Miller v. American
President Lines, 989 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1993); Frantz v. Brunswick Corp.,
866 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Ala. 1994); Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 825 F. Supp.
424 (D.N.H. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1994).
9. In re American Dredging Co., 873 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Emery v.
Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114 (C.D. I11. 1994); In re Cleveland
Tankers, 843 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
10. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31.
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recovery in admiralty and maritime personal injury and death
actions."' Miles did not specifically address the question of whether
punitive damages would continue to be available in general maritime
law personal injury and death actions, but Miles's rationale man-
dates the preclusion of punitive damage awards in all maritime
personal injury and death cases irrespective of the maritime status
of the plaintiff or of the situs of the injury. Until such time as the
Supreme Court resolves the question, however, continuous, incon-
sistent recovery schemes among the circuits will continue.
II. MILES V. APEX MARINE CORPORATION
A plaintiff who seeks to bring an action under general maritime
law arising from a death has standing to do so under two causes
of action. 2 A "survival action" is an action to recover damages
that the decedent could have recovered but for his death."3 The
other cause of action, a "wrongful death action," permits the
decedent's dependents to bring an action to recover damages for
the injury that they have suffered as a result of the decedent's
death. 14 A wrongful death right of action belongs to the decedent's
dependents and is independent of any right of recovery the decedent
may have had for his injury."
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., '16 a seaman was murdered by
a fellow crewman while onboard a vessel in state territorial waters.17
The decedent's mother brought two separate wrongful death ac-
tions. The first action was a negligence-based action under the
Jones Act against her son's employer, and the second action was
an unseaworthiness-based action under general maritime law against
both the charterer and the operators. 8 Under these wrongful death
11. See id. at 36 ("We will not create, under our admiralty powers, a remedy...
that goes well beyond the limits of Congress' ordered system of recovery for
seamen's injury and death.").
12. The traditional rule was that there was no right of survival under general
maritime law. Recently, however, the lower courts have declined to follow this
rule and have recognized a survival right of action under general maritime law.
See, e.g., Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 429 (9th
Cir. 1994).
13. Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093 (2d Cir. 1994).
14. Id. at 1094; Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D. Conn.
1993).
15. See Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 83 ("Generally, a wrongful death action seeks to
recover damages to beneficiaries resulting from the decedent's death. In con-
trast, a survival action is designed to recover damages the decedent could have
recovered but for his death.").
16. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
17. Id. at 21.
18. Id.
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actions, the decedent's mother sought to recover punitive and other
non-pecuniary damages. 19 The decedent's estate brought similar
survivor actions and sought to recover compensation both for the
pain and suffering of the decedent prior to his death and for lost
future income.
2 0
The jury in Miles found that the employer was negligent but
that the ship was seaworthy. As a result, the jury awarded damages
for: (1) loss of support and services pursuant to the negligence-
based action under the Jones Act and (2) pain and suffering
pursuant to the survival action under general maritime law. 2 ' The
jury refused to award damages for loss of society under the
negligence-based action because it found that the mother had not
been financially dependent on the decedent.22
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of sea-
worthiness and remanded the case with instructions to review the
damage award.23 However, the appellate court determined that there
could be no recovery under general maritime law for non-pecuniary
damages.2 4 The court also agreed that a non-dependent parent could
not recover for loss of society in a general maritime wrongful death
action .25
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding, agree-
ing that the recovery available in a general maritime law wrongful
death action was limited to pecuniary damages. In its decision, the
Court resolved two issues. The Court decided that non-pecuniary
damages were not available in either wrongful death actions under
the Jones Act or in wrongful death actions under general maritime
law arising out of a seaman's death occurring in state territorial
waters.
The Supreme Court, by relying on the express limitation con-
tained in DOHSA, 26 found that recovery under the Jones Act was
limited to pecuniary damages. 27 The Court then determined that
19. Id.
20. Id. The district court struck down the claim for punitive damages. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1989).
24. Id. at 985-89.
25. Id. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
punitive damage claims on the ground that the evidence w as insufficient for
the jury to find wanton and willful conduct. Id. at 989.
26. 46 U.S.C. § 761.
27. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31-32. The Court explained:
[A]n admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative enact-
ments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory rem-
edies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such
policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also
19951
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wrongful death damages under general maritime law were available
to seamen killed in state territorial waters. 28 Because the Jones Act
limited the remedies available to injured or dead seamen to pecu-
niary damages, however, the Court concluded that such a general
maritime cause of action could not afford the seamen any greater
rights of recovery. The Court reasoned that it would be inappro-
priate to provide more expansive remedies in a general maritime
law claim than those remedies that Congress had allowed under
the Jones Act. 29 The Court stated:
It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional
scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a
judicially created cause of action in which liability is
without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death
resulting from negligence. We must conclude that there is
no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action
for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.30
Thus, the plaintiff's claim for loss of support or services was
compensable but only to the extent that the family anticipated
future pecuniary benefits from the support or services to be ren-
dered to the surviving family by the deceased.3
III. THE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH CLAIMS
A. Deaths in State Territorial Waters
1. Causes of Action
Actions arising from an individual's death in state territorial
waters that fall within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are
keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress. Congress retains
superior authority in these matters, and admiralty courts must be
vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by
federal legislation. These statutes both direct and delimit our actions.
Id. at 27.
28. Miles, 498 U.S. at 29-30.
29. Id. at 33-34.
30. Id. at 32-33.
31. Id. The Court was also presented with the issue of whether there was a survival
right of action under general maritime law. Despite the traditional rule that
there was no survival action in admiralty and maritime law, the Court recog-
nized the existence of a survivor right of action under the Jones Act. The
Court noted that several lower courts had also recognized a survival right of
action under general maritime law. Nonetheless, the Court held that lost future
income was not recoverable under the Jones Act and, thus, was not recoverable
under any general maritime law survivor right of action. As a result, the Court
declined to decide whether there was a survivor right of action under general
maritime law. Id. at 34.
[Vol. 25
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divided according to the status of the plaintiff.3 2 For example, there
are two possible maritime causes of action when a "non-seaman" is
killed in state territorial waters. The first cause of action is a
negligence claim under general maritime law. The second cause of
action is an unseaworthiness claim, also under general maritime law.33
These two causes of action may be raised by either the decedent's
dependent, in a wrongful death action, or by his estate, in a survivor
action.
On the other hand, there are three possible causes of action
under maritime law when a "seaman" is killed in state territorial
waters. The first cause of action is a negligence action against his
employer under the Jones Act.34 The second cause of action is an
32. Throughout this discussion, the term "passenger" will also be used to refer to
the general class of non-seamen plaintiffs.
33. An unseaworthiness action is brought under general maritime law and arises
out of an alleged defective condition of the vessel. Seaworthiness is "a warranty
premised on the theory that a vessel owner warrants . . . a seaworthy vessel
and crew." Smallwood v. American Trading & Transp. Co., 839 F. Supp.
1377, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Owners and operators of vessels can be held
strictly liable for breaching this warranty. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944); Smallwood, 837 F. Supp. at 1379 ("Unseaworthiness . . . is a
form of strict liability imposed upon the vessel owner for failure to supply a
seaworthy vessel and crew."). Specifically, owners and operators of vessels are
liable under an unseaworthiness action if they breach the absolute duty they
owe to maintain the ship and appurtenances in a reasonably fit condition for
their intended use. Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 1992 AMC
528, 531 (E.D. La. 1991) (citing Smith v. Ithica Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 219 (5th
Cir. 1980), to support claim that "[a] seaman may recover for unseaworthiness
upon proof that the shipowner has failed to furnish a vessel and equipment
reasonably fit for their indended use"); Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So. 2d
921, 931 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1979), to support claim that unseaworthiness may arise from the employ-
ment of unsafe method of work such as the shipowner's failure to provide
adequate equipment for the performance of assigned task or necessary safety
equipment); see also id. (citing Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d
1347 (5th Cir. 1988), overruled by Bridgett v. Odeco, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1249,
1251-54 (La. Ct. App. 1994)).
A claim of unseaworthiness was raised by the plaintiff in In re Mardoc
Asbestos Case Clusters 1, 2, 5 and 6, 768 F. Supp. 595, 598-600 (E.D. Mich.
1991). In this case, the district court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
punitive damages could be awarded in an unseaworthiness claim under general
maritime law. The court determined that the duty of the shipowner to maintain
a seaworthy vessel was absolute and that it existed regardless of the shipowner's
fault. Morever, the court reasoned that, because a shipowner was strictly liable
for injuries caused by unseaworthy conditions, his state of mind in allowing
such conditions to exist was irrelevant. As a result, because punitive damages
could be awarded only when a defendant's state of mind could be shown, the
court concluded that punitive damages could not be awarded in an action for
unseaworthiness. Id.
34. The Jones Act creates a right of action for injury and death to seamen caused
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unseaworthiness claim against either the decedent's employer or any
third party under general maritime law.35 The final cause of action
is a negligence action against a third party under general maritime
law.3 6 These three causes of action may be asserted by either the
seaman's dependent, in a wrongful death action, or by his estate, in
a survivor action.
2. Cases Precluding the Recovery of Punitive Damages
Both the Jones Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Miles
v. Apex Marine Corp. prohibit the recovery of punitive damages in
by the negligence of their employers. 46 U.S.C. § 688. Any claim under the
Jones Act must be brought by a seaman and must arise out of an injury
occurring within the scope of his employment. Id. Negligence is the only basis
for liability, and the only proper defendant is the seaman's employer. Id. The
Jones Act is also not limited by a geographical or situs requirement and, thus,
provides a seaman with recovery whether he is killed or injured in state waters
or on the high seas. Id.; see Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26
F.3d 1247, 1250 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the Jones Act provides a cause of
action for negligence against an employer for any seaman injured in the course
of his employment). Establishing that the injured party is a seaman is the
threshold issue in any Jones Act claim. To establish that the injured party is
a Jones Act seaman he must demonstrate that at the time of the injury or
death: (1) he maintained a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial
in both its duration and its nature, (2) the vessel was in navigation, and (3)
his employment contributed to the function of the vessel or accomplishment
of its mission. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2173, 2190-91 (1995);
McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991); Mitola v. Johns
Hopkins Univ. Applied'Physics Lab., 839 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Md. 1993)
(explaining that to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, an individual is
not required to have aided in navigation duties but must have contributed to
the function of the vessel or accomplishment of its mission).
"A Jones Act plaintiff enjoys two significant advantages over the plaintiff
in a common-law negligence case. First, the standard of care owed to a seaman
is higher than the common-law standard." Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 1368,
1372 (Ala. 1991). "Second, the Jones Act plaintiff's burden on the issue of
causation has been described as 'featherweight."' Id. at 1372-73. "That burden
is satisfied if the plaintiff establishes 'that employe[r's] negligence played any
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages
are sought."' Id. "[Uinder the Jones Act, a vessel owner will be deemed
negligent if he fails to exercise reasonable care to maintain a reasonably safe
work environment." Ceja v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 690 F.2d 1191, 1193 (5th Cir.
1982). "[T]he slightest negligence is sufficient to sustain a finding of liability
[under the Jones Act]." Ward v. American Haw. Cruises, 719 F. Supp. 915,
922 (D. Haw. 1988).
35. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33; see, e.g., Rollins v. Peterson Builders, 761 F. Supp.
943 (D.R.I. 1991).
36. The Third Circuit recently chronicled the development of the causes of action
arising from a death in admiralty and maritime law and held that federal
admiralty law does not preempt the application of state survival statutes for
the death of recreational boaters (non-seamen) within territorial waters. See
Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 630-37.
[Vol. 25
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wrongful death or survival actions against the employer of a seaman
killed in state territorial waters.3 7 The Sixth Circuit has extended
Miles to preclude the recovery of punitive damages in general mari-
time law claims arising from the death of a seaman in state territorial
waters as well. In Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd.," the
Sixth Circuit held that punitive damages were not available in a
seaman's unseaworthiness-based wrongful death action under general
maritime law.39 In Miller, two claims were asserted against several
vessel owners based on the decedent's exposure to asbestos and other
toxic chemicals. 4° The decedent's dependents asserted a negligence-
based wrongful death action under the Jones Act and an unsea-
worthiness-based wrongful death action under general maritime law.4
The plaintiffs sought to recover punitive damages pursuant to the
unseaworthiness claim. 42 Relying on Miles, the defendants argued
that punitive damages were not available under general maritime law.
The district court rejected this contention and refused to extend Miles
beyond its facts. 43 The jury awarded punitive damages and the
defendants appealed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision.
Unlike the district court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Miles was
controlling." The court first noted that Miles precluded any award
of punitive damages under the Jones Act. 45 The court then found
that the goal of Miles was to articulate a uniform rule regarding the
availability of non-pecuniary damages in all death claims brought by
seamen, regardless of whether the action was brought under the
Jones Act or under general maritime law. 46 The circuit court, thus,
held that because punitive damages were not available under the
Jones Act, punitive damages must be similarly unavailable in a
general maritime law unseaworthiness action for the wrongful death
of a seaman.
47
The court was concerned about the inconsistency that would
result from allowing the recovery of punitive damages in general
maritime law actions but not in Jones Act actions and concluded
that such inconsistency was unacceptable and contrary to the goals
37. See Smallwood, 839 F. Supp. at 1380 (Jones Act and DOHSA limit recovery
to pecuniary loss).
38. 989 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993).
39. Id. at 1454.
40. Id. at 1453.
41. Id. at 1454.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1455.
44. Id.
45. Id.




of establishing a uniform compensation scheme s.4  The court ex-
plained:
The question before us is whether the unavailability of
punitive damages under the Jones Act precludes recovery
of punitive damages under a general maritime law unsea-
worthiness claim for the wrongful death of a seaman. Our
analysis of this question must be guided by the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Miles.
49
Under Miles, then, the goal of this court is to articulate
a uniform rule regarding the availability of punitive damages
in all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman.50
Allowing punitive damages would create two major in-
consistencies in federal maritime wrongful death law. First,
punitive damages would be available for some deaths oc-
curring in territorial waters but not for deaths occurring on
the high seas. Second, punitive damages would be available
for seamen's deaths occurring in territorial waters due to
unseaworthiness but not for those due to negligence....
[N]o court should reintroduce inconsistencies into federal
maritime wrongful death law without strong policy reasons.5'
The Second Circuit has also extended Miles to preclude the
recovery of punitive damages in general maritime law claims arising
from the death of a passenger in state territorial waters. In Wahistrom
v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. ,52 the decedent was killed when
his jet ski collided with a power boat on the Thames River in
Connecticut." His survivors brought negligence-based wrongful death
and survivor actions under general maritime law.54 Because the de-
cedent was not a seaman and because the injury occurred on state
territorial waters, neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA were controlling.
The court applied Miles's holding and denied the recovery of loss of
society damages by the non-dependent parents." The court held that
under the plaintiffs' general maritime law wrongful death action, the
plaintiffs were limited to recovering the amounts that they had paid
48. Id. at 1458.
49. Id. at 1455.
50. Id. at 1457.
51. Id. at 1457-58 (footnotes omitted).
52. 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993).
53. Id. at 1093.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1092-93.
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for any funeral expenses and for related medical expenses.16 The
plaintiffs were also precluded from recovering any damages for
mental anguish 7 The court allowed recovery, however, for loss of
support and services to the extent that the plaintiffs anticipated
future pecuniary benefits from support or services to be rendered to
them by their deceased son.18 As for the plaintiffs' survivor action,
the court ruled that recovery could be had for the pain and suffering
inflicted upon the decedent prior to his death.5 9 Recovery for loss of
future earnings and loss of enjoyment of life was not allowed.
0
The Second Circuit next addressed the question of the availability
of punitive damages and held that the prohibition of the recovery of
non-pecuniary damages under the plaintiffs' general maritime law
wrongful death and survivor rights also barred the recovery of
punitive damages .6 The court explained:
We are in general agreement with the view that plaintiffs
who are not allowed by general maritime law to seek non-
pecuniary damages for loss of society should also be barred
from seeking non[-]pecuniary punitive damages. In addition,
a number of district courts have invoked the Supreme
Court's ruling in Miles as a basis to disallow punitive
damages for claims under the general maritime law in order
to further uniformity between that law and the analogous
federal statutes, DOHSA and the Jones Act. Most of these
cases involved claims by seamen, and there are a few district
court rulings to the contrary. Overall, however, this post-
Miles authority lends additional support to our conclusion
that the [plaintiffs] should not be allowed to pursue punitive
damages under the general maritime law.
62
The Supreme Court of Alabama applied similar reasoning in
Choat v. Kawasaki Motors.63 In Choat, the decedent was hit by a
jet ski and was killed while relaxing on an inflatable float on the
Tennessee RiverA4 The decedent's mother filed a negligence-based
56. Id. at 1093.
57. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1093 (holding grief and mental anguish non-compensable
under federal maritime law).
58. Id.; see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir.
1994) ("Under federal maritime law the rule is well-established that only
dependents may recover damages for loss of decedent's society.").
59. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1093.
60. Id. at 1093-94.
61. Id. at 1093.
62. Id. at 1094 (citations omitted).
63. 1994 AMC 2626 (Ala. 1994).
64. Id. at 2627.
19951
Baltimore Law Review
wrongful death action seeking punitive damages. 6 The trial court
concluded that general maritime law applied and dismissed the plain-
tiff's punitive damage claim." Although the court recognized that
Miles did not directly address the question of the availability of
punitive damages, the court found that the rule established in Miles
precluded the recovery of all non-pecuniary damages, including pu-
nitive damages. 67 The court reasoned that to allow punitive damages
under general maritime law when they were not recoverable under
the primary maritime statutes would be contrary to the decision in
Miles.6 The court also noted that the Supreme Court, in Miles,
cautioned against recognizing general maritime law remedies that
were more expansive than those available under the extensive mari-
time statutory scheme. 69
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2640.
68. Choat, 1994 AMC at 2640.
69. Id. at 2640-42. In Walker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1994), the
operator of a fishing boat died when his boat collided with another vessel on
the Turtle Bayou in Louisiana state territorial waters. Id. at 529. His wife and
child brought a survival action seeking to recover non-pecuniary damages. Id.
Relying on Miles, the court rejected the plaintiffs' damage claim and held that
non-pecuniary damages were not recoverable. Id. at 533. The court explained:
The Supreme Court's decision in Miles is important in two respects.
First, the Supreme Court has indicated that the policy of providing
uniformity in the type of damages recoverable in a maritime wrongful
death action, whether brought pursuant to statute or the common
law, is an important ingredient in determining whether certain types
of damages-such as loss of society-are recoverable. Second, Miles
represents a doctrinal shift away from a broad reading of "special
solicitude" and toward a more narrow one. Rather than provide
"special solicitude" . . . the Supreme Court has indicated in Miles
that uniformity in maritime law requires that those who sue under
general maritime law receive no more "solicitude" than those who
sue under the DOHSA or the Jones Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993), a
passenger was killed in a boating accident on the Potomac River. Id. at 82.
His estate filed a survival action under general maritime law against the
defendant. Id. The district court held that funeral expenses and pre-death pain
and suffering were compensable. Id. at 83. Lost future earnings and loss of
enjoyment of life were found not to be recoverable. Id. at 83-84. The plaintiff
noted that such damages were recoverable by a seaman and attempted to
persuade the court to draw a distinction between seamen and passengers. The
court, however, rejected the plaintiff's plea. Id.
In Rollins v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 943 (D.R.I. 1991), a
seaman was electrocuted and killed while working on board a research vessel.
Id. at 944. Her parents subsequently asserted a wrongful death action for
negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under general maritime
law seeking to recover punitive damages. Id. The defendants moved to strike
[Vol. 25
1995] Punitive Damages in Admiralty Law
3. Cases Permitting the Recovery of Punitive Damages
Not all courts, however, have precluded the recovery of punitive
damages in general maritime cases. In Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v.
the punitive damage claim based on the Supreme Court's decision in Miles and
argued the following two points: (1) that punitive damages were non-pecuniary
in nature, and were, therefore, not available under the Jones Act and (2) that
because these damages were not available under the Jones Act, "then, in
keeping with the desire to create uniformity in maritime law, punitive damages
should not [have been] available under general maritime law." Id. at 945. The
district court held that punitive damages were not available under the Jones
Act because recovery under the Jones Act was limited to pecuniary damages.
Id. at 948. The court also held that the plaintiffs were precluded from recovering
punitive damages under their general maritime law claim. Id. The court declined
to permit the recovery of punitive damages in claims arising from a death in
state territorial waters so as not to create an inconsistency with the preclusion
set forth in DOHSA. Id. at 949. The court explained:
If this Court were to allow punitive damages for wrongful death
pursuant to general maritime law, we would be creating an inconsis-
tency. DOHSA clearly does not allow punitive damages for wrongful
death on either a theory of negligence of [sic] unseaworthiness. A
DOHSA plaintiff, one whose decedent died "on the high seas" is
precluded from a remedy under general maritime law. A Jones Act
seaman, however, is not precluded from such a general maritime
recovery because unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act only provides remedies
for negligence, not unseaworthiness. If Jones Act seamen could get
recovery for wrongful death within coastal waters that included pu-
nitive damages, they would be allowed a remedy that is unavailable
to others who die "on the high seas." Such an anomaly would fly in
the face of the Apex Court's admonition that remedies may only be
supplemented where the application will be uniform.
Id. at 949-50 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
The court also held that the preclusion in Miles applied both to the plaintiffs'
wrongful death and to their survival claims. The court explained:
Because punitive damages are not losses, they are not recoverable
under the Jones Act nor are they recoverable under general maritime
law pursuant to the allowed survival action. In the instant case, this
means that although the plaintiffs have survival claims sounding in
negligence and unseaworthiness, their claim for punitive damages
under these theories is not viable. Punitive damages, like the lost
future earnings disallowed in Apex, are not losses suffered during the
decedent's lifetime.
Id. at 950 (internal quotations omitted); see also Smith v. Trinidad Corp., 992
F.2d 996, 996 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding loss of society and loss of
consortium unavailable under either Jones Act or general maritime law); Trident
Marine, Inc., v. M/V Atticos, 876 F. Supp. 832, 837 (E.D. La. 1994) (barring
the recovery of non-pecuniary damages from third-party defendant in general
maritime claim arising from the death of a seaman in state territorial waters);
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Red Fox Indus., 813 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (E.D. La.
1993) (holding loss of society damages precluded in suit under general maritime
law by heirs of seaman against non-employer); Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water
Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151, 1153-54 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that
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American S.S. Co., 70 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that a Jones Act seaman could recover
non-pecuniary damages in a negligence-based wrongful death action
under general maritime law against a defendant who was not his
employer. 71 In Cleveland Tankers, the defendants argued for the
extension, beyond DOHSA claims, of the limitation on damages
established in Miles claiming that the limit on punitive damages
should also apply to general maritime claims against third party
defendants. 72 The defendants reasoned that to hold otherwise would
be to restore the "very inconsistencies sought to be eliminated in
Miles and Miller." 73 The federal district court rejected this contention
and concluded that the defendants' argument called for "too broad"
of an extension of Miles.74 The court explained that Miles was limited
to claims by a Jones Act seaman against his employer. 75 This reading
of Miles was necessary, in the court's view, to maintain consistency
in recovery of damages for claims brought under the Jones Act. 76
Apparently, the court's concern for uniformity did not extend beyond
claims brought under DOHSA and the Jones Act and, thus, did not




preclusion in Miles applies to general maritime law death action involving a
non-seaman killed in state territorial waters); Bridgett v. Odeco, Inc., 646 So.
2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding punitive damages not available under
general maritime law), overruling Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So. 2d 921,
931 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
843 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
71. Id.









Id. The Third Circuit held that the estate of a non-seaman killed in state
territorial waters could recover punitive damages under state law. Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
1998 (1995). In Calhoun, the plaintiff was killed in a boating accident in the
waters off Puerto Rico. Id. at 624. The estate sued under Pennsylvania's
wrongful death and survival statutes and sought to recover punitive damages.
Id. The district court held that federal maritime law displaced state remedies,
and that, therefore, punitive damages were not available. Id. The Third Circuit
reversed, holding: "maritime law does not preempt state wrongful death and
survival acts in actions based on the death of a nonseaman in territorial
waters." Id. at 644. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress had not indicated
that federal law should occupy the field of actions where a recreational boater
was killed in state territorial waters and (2) there was no conflict between
federal and state law. Id. at 637, 640-44. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that principles of uniformity compelled a finding that federal maritime
law displaced state law, holding that the argument failed to appreciate the
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In Powers v. Bayliner Marine Corp.," four passengers were
killed when their sailboat capsized on Lake Michigan. 79 Their bene-
ficiaries asserted wrongful death actions under general maritime law
against the manufacturer of the sailboat. 80 The plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for loss of society and punitive damages.8' The
defendant, relying on Miles, argued that the plaintiffs were precluded
from recovering non-pecuniary damages, such as loss of society and
punitive damages, under general maritime law.82 The district court
rejected the defendant's reading of Miles as being "much broader
than its holding.""
The district court held that Miles's prohibition against the re-
covery of punitive damages was limited to claims asserted on behalf
of a Jones Act seaman against his employer 4 The court acknowl-
edged that other courts had held to the contrary,85 but explained that
"th[ose] rulings represent[ed] anticipatory extensions of Miles. "86
Instead, the district court chose to "follow[] the course charted by
a growing list of authorities that ha[d] read Miles more narrowly
.... After finding that Miles applied only where a statute spe-
cifically precluded recovery, the court addressed the question of
punitive damages.88
The defendant argued that punitive damages were precisely the
kind of non-pecuniary damages precluded by the "uniformity drag-
net" articulated in Miles.89 The court again acknowledged that pu-
nitive damages were non-pecuniary and that other courts had relied
on the holding in Miles to preclude the recovery of punitive damages
in general maritime claims. 90 Nevertheless, the court rejected this
overly broad reading of Miles.9' The court concluded that a more
relevancy boundaries of uniformity. Id. at 643. Instead, the court viewed the
uniformity argument as weak "rhetoric" that permeated the case law. See id.
at 636 ("[AJlthough the cases often mention uniformity as a guiding principle,
the Court's actions belie its importance."). The court openly stated: "[Tihe
thrust of these cases [finding uniformity a tethering principle] suggests that the
concept of uniformity has a good deal less weight than has been thought."
Id.
78. 855 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. Mich. 1994).









88. Id. at 202.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 202-03.
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narrow reading of Miles was appropriate, explaining: "[A] careful
reading of the case law reveals that punitive damages have been
disallowed under general maritime law, consistent with Miles, only
when allowing them would contravene not just a general policy
favoring uniformity, but an established definite statutory scheme."
'92
None of the maritime statutes extended to the plaintiffs' general
maritime claims. The district court, therefore, held that Miles had
no preclusive effect. 93 The court reasoned:
Plaintiffs' claims do not assert the interests of a seaman
or a longshoreman. Their claims arise under general mari-
time law and are of a nature having no counterpart under
any maritime statute. They are based on products liability
theories and come within the bounds of admiralty jurisdic-
tion. . . . Their claims for punitive damages do not run
afoul of Miles'[s] uniform rule regarding the claims of
seamen or the general congressional policy recognized in
Miller. Under these circumstances, if punitive damages were
formerly recoverable under general maritime law, then Miles
and Miller stand as no impediment to their continuing
availability, given appropriate facts. 94
In Newhouse v. United States,95 the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada precluded the recovery of punitive damages
in maritime wrongful death claims but refused to extend the limitation
in Miles to survival claims. 96 The claims in Newhouse arose from a
collision between a privately-owned motor boat and a United States
92. Id. at 202.
93. Id. at 202-03.
94. Id. at 203; see also Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that survival claims for non-pecuniary damages may be pursued in a case
involving the death of a non-seaman in state territorial waters); Complaint of
American Dredging Co., 873 F. Supp. 1539, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding
that the estate of a non-seaman killed in state territorial waters could recover
non-pecuniary damages); In re Morehead Marine, 844 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (holding that the estate of a passenger killed in state territorial
waters could recover punitive damages in a wrongful death action under general
maritime law); Petition of Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1157, 1159
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that Miles did not foreclose a claim for non-
pecuniary damages against a non-employer by a Jones Act seaman's family
member in a wrongful death action under general maritime law); Mussa v.
Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 84, 86-87 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (limiting Miles
to its facts); Sugden v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 796 F. Supp. 455, 457
(W.D. Wash. 1992) (permitting recovery of non-pecuniary damages in claim
by family of a Jones Act seaman against a non-employer).
95. 844 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Nev. 1994).
96. Id. at 1394.
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Park Service motor boat on Lake Mead in Nevada.9 7 Two passengers
on the privately-owned boat were killed as a result of the collision. 9
Their parents brought a negligence-based survivor action and a
wrongful death action under general maritime law against the United
States Park Service. 99 The United States Park Service, advocating an
expansive reading of Miles that would limit recovery in all general
maritime death claims to pecuniary losses, argued that the plaintiffs'
actions should be dismissed because the plaintiffs could not demon-
strate that they suffered any pecuniary loss.l°°
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that: (1) the preclusion
in Miles was inapplicable to claims arising out of the deaths of non-
seamen and (2) even if the limitation in Miles did extend to non-
seamen, the preclusion did not apply to survivor claims. 10' Thus, the
plaintiffs attempted to preserve their survival action on the grounds
that Miles was limited to wrongful death actions and that punitive
and pecuniary damages were recoverable in survival actions. 0 2
The district court rejected both arguments and held that the
preclusion in Miles applied to non-seamen and wrongful death ac-
tions, but not to survivor claims. 103 The court concluded:
* * * Miles should be construed neither as expansively nor
narrowly as the parties contend.
In light of the sweeping language used by the Supreme
Court in Miles, there is no indication that the Supreme
Court intended that its decision should be limited to those
actions involving seamen. Indeed, such a holding would lead
to the anomalous result that seamen-those who are entitled
the greatest protection under maritime law-would be af-
forded a lesser degree of protection than non-seamen.
Furthermore, there is no indication that the Supreme
Court intended that survival damages should be limited to
those that are pecuniary in nature. Nothing in Miles indicates
that the Ninth Circuit's holding . . . regarding the recovery
of pre-death pain and suffering, punitive damages or pre-
97. Id. at 1391.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1391-92.
100. Id. at 1393.
101. Id.
102. Id. In a survival action, the decedent's successors are allowed to pursue a claim
for personal injury that the decedent would have been able to pursue if he
had lived. Id. at n.3. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)).
In a wrongful death action, the decedent's family seeks recovery for the harm
that they suffered as a result of the decedent's death. Id.
103. Id. at 1393-94.
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judgment interest in a general maritime survival action is
still not good law.' 4
B. Deaths on the High Seas
1. Causes of Action
The causes of action available for a claim arising out of a death
on the high seas are best understood when broken down into wrongful
death actions and survival actions. There are essentially three wrong-
ful death causes of action that can be brought as a result of the
death of either a seaman or a non-seaman on the high seas: (1) a
negligence-based action under DOHSA, 05 (2) an unseaworthiness-
based action under DOHSA,' °6 and (3) a negligence action under the
Jones Act asserted by a seaman's estate against his employer. 10 7
Because DOHSA does not provide for a survival action, any negli-
gence-based or unseaworthiness-based survival actions must be as-
serted under general maritime law. 01 Additionally, a seaman's survivors
may assert a negligence-based survival action against the seaman's
employer under the Jones Act.109 Plaintiffs may not recover punitive
damages under any of the three wrongful death actions or under the
Jones Act survival action." 0 There is a conflict among the circuits
as to whether punitive damages are available in the general maritime
law survival actions.
2. Preclusion of Recovery of Punitive Damages
Both DOHSA and the Jones Act preclude the recovery of
punitive damages in any claim for a wrongful death on the high
seas."' The Jones Act also precludes the recovery of punitive damages
in any survival action arising from a death on the high seas." 2 Under
104. Id.
105. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (Supp. 1988). DOHSA provides for a wrongful death action
based on the theories of unseaworthiness and negligence for anyone killed on
the high seas. See generally Strehle v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 136, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
106. Newhouse, 844 F. Supp. at 1393-94.
107. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
108. See generally Howard v. Crystal Cruises, 1992 AMC 1645 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that DOHSA does not bar survival claim under general maritime law).
109. In sum, the Jones Act contains both a wrongful death provision and a survival
provision. DOHSA contains a wrongful death provision but does not contain
a survival provision. General maritime law provides both a wrongful death and
a survival right of action. See generally Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 637.
110. See Smallwood, 839 F. Supp. 1377, 1383-84 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
111. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Jones Act); id. § 761 (DOHSA).
112. Id. § 688.
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Miles, non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable in any wrongful
death or survival action under general maritime law." 3 Accordingly,
a survival action under general maritime law arising out of a passen-
ger's death on the high seas would be the only case where it might
be possible to recover punitive damages." 4 Courts have, however,
uniformly extended Miles beyond seamen's claims and have held that
punitive damages are precluded in general maritime law survival
claims arising from deaths on the high seas." 5
C. Non-Fatal Injuries in State Territorial Waters and on The
High Seas
1. Causes of Action
A seaman injured either on the high seas or within state territorial
waters has four potential claims: (1) a negligence claim under the
Jones Act against his employer," 6 (2) an unseaworthiness claim under
general maritime law against any defendant, including his employer,"
7
(3) a claim for maintenance and cure under general maritime law
against his employer,"" and (4) a general maritime law negligence
113. Miles, 498 U.S. at 328.
114. The Jones Act and DOHSA limit any recovery to pecuniary damages. See In
re Watermen S.S. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (E.D. La. 1992) (noting
that the focus of Miles is on the status of the decedent as a seaman). Where
DOHSA applies, its pecuniary remedies cannot be supplemented by punitive
damages under general maritime law. 46 U.S.C. § 762; Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
Although the Jones Act does not have an express provision limiting recoverable
losses to pecuniary ones, after Miles it is unquestionable that seamen, whether
asserting a claim pursuant to the Jones Act or to general maritime law, are
limited to recovering pecuniary damages. In re Watermen S.S. Corp., 780 F.
Supp. at 1094-95. Accordingly, survival rights must be pursued under general
maritime law. But, in the interest of uniformity, some courts, relying on Miles,
have held that punitive damages are not available under general maritime law.
See, e.g., id. at 1096 (holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under
general maritime law claims arising from deaths on the high seas).
115. See Davis v. Bender Shipbldg. and Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 430 (9th Cir.
1994) (foreclosing recovery of pecuniary damages); Ellison v. Messerschmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm, 807 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding neither punitive
nor exemplary damages to be recoverable under general maritime law); In re
Aleutian Enter., 777 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding punitive
damages not recoverable under DOHSA, the Jones Act or general maritime
law in actions arising from death or injury on high seas).
116. Jackson v. Unisea, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 895, 896 (D. Alaska 1992).
117. Id.
118. "Maintenance and cure is [sic] designed to provide a seaman with food and
lodging when he becomes sick or injured in the ship's service." Brown, 816
P.2d at 1371 (quoting Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962)); see also
Davis v. Odeco Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing "main-
tenance and cure" as a seaman's right, under general maritime law, "to receive
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claim against any third party, except for his employer."1 9 A non-
seaman, such as a repairman or passenger, who is injured in state
territorial waters or on the high seas may assert a general maritime
law negligence claim. 120
Unlike death cases, there are no situs distinctions drawn by any
statute or precedent that discriminate among the causes of action
available in maritime personal injury cases. The absence of a situs
distinction, however, has not left the maritime personal injury area
without its anomalies. There is a status distinction drawn between a
seaman's unseaworthiness claims and a non-seaman's unseaworthiness
claims. Although both seamen and non-seamen are entitled to bring
an unseaworthiness claim for wrongful death under DOHSA and
under general maritime law, non-seamen have no unseaworthiness
cause of action in a claim arising from a non-fatal injury.
121
2. Cases Precluding the Recovery of Punitive Damages
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have extended Miles to bar the recovery of punitive damages in
general maritime law claims arising from an injury on the high seas
or in state territorial waters.12 2 In Frantz v. Brunswick Corp., 123 the
owner of a motor boat was injured in a boating accident on the
food and lodging (maintenance) and necessary medical services (cure) if he
falls ill while in the service of [the ship]"); Mitola, 839 F. Supp. at 359 (citing
Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1359 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that
maintenance and cdire ends when a seaman reaches the point of maximum
possible cure-the point at which further treatment will probably not improve
his condition)). "[lit extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do
a seaman's work and continues until he reaches maximum medical recovery."
Brown, 816 P.2d at 1371 (quoting Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531
(1962)). The shipowner is not responsible for any injury or illness that was
caused by the seaman's gross and willful misconduct or that existed at the
time the seaman signed on and that was knowingly concealed. Id. (citation
omitted). "When considered in conjunction with the sailor's right to recover
for negligence and unseaworthiness . . . , [the seaman] is . . . the beneficiary
of a system of accident and health insurance at the shipowner's expense more
comprehensive than anything yet achieved by shorebound workers." Id. (cita-
tion and footnote omitted).
119. See, e.g., In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
120. A vessel owner owes a duty of reasonable care to its passengers. Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Morton v. De
Oliviera, 984 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding shipowner absolutely liable
for its crew members' assault upon passengers); DeRoche v. Commodore Cruise
Line Ltd., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
121. In non-fatal injury cases, the doctrine of unseaworthiness is available only to
seamen and does not extend to passengers. Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc.,
1992 AMC 1645, 1653 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
122. See, e.g., infra notes 123-47 and accompanying text.
123. 866 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Ala. 1994).
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Alabama River. 124 He asserted several negligence and products liability
claims, under general maritime law and state law, against several
defendants involved in the boat's manufacture and sale, and sought
to recover punitive damages . 25 The defendants argued that Miles
prohibited the recovery of punitive damages under general maritime
law. 126 The plaintiff argued that Miles did not bar the recovery of
non-pecuniary damages under general maritime law. 27 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama rejected
the plaintiff's assertion and held that punitive damages were not
available under general maritime law. 128 The court agreed with the
defendant and extended Miles's holding to claims arising out of a
passenger's non-fatal injury. 129 The court acknowledged that there
was no statutory prohibition against punitive damages because the
case sub judice involved non-fatal injuries to a non-seaman. 30 Nev-
ertheless, the court found that Miles had eliminated the availability
of punitive damages in general maritime law claims.' 3 '
In Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc.,' 13 2 the plaintiffs, who were
injured in a boating accident on the high seas, asserted negligence
and unseaworthiness claims under general maritime law and sought
to recover non-pecuniary damages.'33 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington dismissed both claims because
the plaintiffs were passengers, not seamen. 114 On appeal, the plaintiffs
attempted to persuade the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit to distinguish between fatal and non-fatal injury cases
and to permit the recovery of non-pecuniary damages.'35 Following
the "interest of consistency" analysis articulated in Miles, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention. 3 6 The court remarked:
"To so hold would effectively reward a [defendant] for killing, rather
than merely injuring his victim.'
13 7
In Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp.,3' the plaintiff, a seaman, sus-
tained back injuries in the course of his employment aboard a vessel
124. Id. at 529.
125. Id. at 529-30.
126. Id. at 532.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 531-32.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
133. Id. at 2649 (loss of consortium, loss of society and emotional distress).
134. Id. at 1401.
135. Id. at 1408.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 825 F. Supp. 424 (D. Mass. 1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1994).
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operating in state territorial waters.3 9 As a result of the accident the
plaintiff asserted the following claims: (1) negligence and breach of
contract under the Jones Act and (2) unseaworthiness and mainte-
nance and cure under general maritime law. 14° The plaintiff sought
to recover punitive damages in conjunction with the negligence and
unseaworthiness claims.141 The plaintiff argued that the Miles analysis
was inapplicable to personal injury actions. 42 He further contended
that Miles should not be extended to bar non-pecuniary damages in
Jones Act injury claims. 43 The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts rejected these contentions and dismissed
the plaintiff's punitive damage claim. 44 The trial court explained:
The [plaintiffs] misunderstand and grossly underestimate
the impact of the Miles holding. First, the Miles Court
distinctly held, based upon its review of the legislative
history of the Jones Act, that the Jones Act itself bars
recovery of non[-]pecuniary damages for the wrongful death
of a Jones Act seaman. . . . Second . . . Miles expressly
"removed the judicial underpinnings of [the pre-Miles cases
that permitted the recovery of non-pecuniary damages in
Jones Act injury cases]." Thus, pre-Miles cases . . . which
• . . allow[ed] recovery of non[-]pecuniary damages in Jones
Act injury actions, were impliedly if not expressly overruled
by Miles. Finally, the Court notes that maritime uniformity
is better advanced by unifying damage schemes under the
Jones Act as a whole, for both the injury and death of
Jones Act seamen . ...
In fact, although no court in the First Circuit has ad-
dressed a non[-]pecuniary damage claim in a Jones Act
injury case subsequent to Miles, every court which has
considered the issue has held that Miles precludes loss of
consortium and punitive damages claims in injury actions
by Jones Act seamen.
145
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit agreed with the district court and held that the plaintiffs were
precluded from recovering punitive damages. 146 The court held that
Miles "mandated" the exclusion of punitive damages in injury claims
139. Id. at 425.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 425-26.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 426.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. 15 F.3d at 200, 203 (1st Cir. 1994).
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under the Jones Act and in unseaworthiness actions under general
maritime law.
47
147. Id. In Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1992), the plaintiff, a seaman injured in Louisiana state territorial waters,
brought suit against his employer. Id. at 128. He asserted a negligence claim
under the Jones Act and an unseaworthiness claim under general maritime law
seeking non-pecuniary damages. Id. The court held that Miles precluded such
recovery in a seaman's personal injury claim. Id. at 131.
In Bayes v. OPI Int'l, 1994 AMC 286 (S.D. Tex. 1992), the plaintiff was
injured while working on board a vessel. Id. He filed a negligence claim under
the Jones Act and general maritime law seeking punitive damages. Id. The
district court dismissed the punitive damage claim and reasoned that it was
compelled to do so because the Fifth Circuit extended Miles to personal injury
claims involving Jones Act seamen. Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted). The court
noted that, in Miles, the Supreme Court "sought to promote recovery for non-
pecuniary damages under the general maritime law because such recovery was
not permitted under the Jones Act." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, because
punitive damages were non-pecuniary, the court held that the plaintiff's claim
for punitive damages under the general maritime law had to be dismissed. Id.
(citations omitted).
In Anderson v. Texaco, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1992), the court,
underscoring the applicability of Miles, held that a Jones Act seaman could
not recover punitive damages for an injury regardless of whether the claim
was for negligence or unseaworthiness. Id. at 535. The plaintiff argued that
Miles "did not target punitive damages and should not be extended to bar
such awards," while the defendant argued that Miles had "limited the remedies
available under the general maritime law theories to those the Jones Act
allows." Id. The court concluded:
To say that Miles should be strictly limited to its facts is to ignore
the doctrinal underpinnings of the decision. Miles compels the con-
clusion that a plaintiff who is statutorily barred from receiving a
punitive award cannot recover punitive damages by couching his claim
in the judge-made general maritime law of negligence and unseawor-
thiness .... Thus, although courts "may supplement" a seaman's
remedies when Congress has left gaps which need to be filled, courts
cannot use their power under the general maritime law to create
remedies that exceed those granted (or limited) by statute. Uniformity
and respect for legislative dictates animate Miles.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bell v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 855 F. Supp.
152 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding punitive damages not recoverable in seaman's
general maritime law claim); Brown v. Lady Alice, 1995 AMC 73 (D. Haw.
1994) (precluding recovery of punitive damages in personal injury claim by
seaman); White v. American River Transp. Co., 853 F. Supp. 300, 301 (S.D.
Ill. 1993) (holding that punitive damages are available for willful and wanton
failure to provide maintenance and cure); Earhart v. Chevron, Inc., 852 F.
Supp. 515 (E.D. La. 1993) (holding that injured plaintiff has no general
maritime law claim for punitive damages); Anderson v. Texaco, Inc., 797 F.
Supp. 531, 533-35 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding that seamen injured as a result of
gas explosion are precluded from recovering punitive damages under the Jones
Act and general maritime law); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp.
679, 682 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (barring recovery of punitive damages in seaman's
general maritime law unseaworthiness claim); Bayes v. OPI Int'l, 1994 AMC
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The courts have had a more difficult time reaching a consensus
as to whether punitive damages are available in maintenance and
cure cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has held that although punitive damages are precluded in maritime
death and personal injury cases, such damages are recoverable in
maintenance and cure claims. 48 In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas
Corp. ,149 a seaman who was injured in state territorial waters brought
suit against his employer.'50 The plaintiff sought to recover punitive
damages from his employer for failure to pay maintenance and cure
on a timely basis.' At trial, the jury awarded punitive damages.'
5 2
The employer appealed.'53
On appeal, the employer argued that Miles precluded recovery
of punitive damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure.5 4 The
Fifth Circuit rejected this contention and upheld the district court's
award. The circuit court conceded that the "logic if not the holding
of Miles" supported the employer's argument.' The court also
acknowledged that the weight of authority had held that punitive
damages were unavailable under general maritime law.' 56 Distinguish-
ing these cases on the ground that they were not based on actions
for maintenance and cure,' the court held that Miles did not preclude
recovery of punitive damages in maintenance and cure claims.'58
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., held that punitive
damages were not available in actions for maintenence and cure.'
6°
The court recognized the Fifth Circuit's holding in Guevara but
found Miller and Horsley to be more persuasive. The court held,
286, 288 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (precluding general maritime law claim for punitive
damages); Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 1992 AMC 528,
531 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that the Jones Act and general maritime law do
not permit a seaman to recover punitive damages), rev'd on other grounds,
974 F.2d 646 (1992).
148. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 1279 (5th Cir. 1994).
149. 34 F.3d 1279 (5th Cir. 1994).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1281.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1283.
155. Id. at 1283-84.
156. Id. at 1284.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court found only one case that held that Miles barred recovery of
punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases. Id. (citing Gray v. Texaco,
Inc., 610 So. 2d 1090 (La. Ct. App), cert. denied, 616 So. 2d 686 (La. 1993)).
159. 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
160. Id. at 1505.
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among other things, that precluding punitive damages was consistent
with the holding in Miles.
161
After Glynn was decided by the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
revisited its opinion in Guevara. 162 In an en banc decision, the Fifth
Circuit reversed its prior ruling and held that the uniformity principle
articulated in Miles precluded the award of punitive damages in
maintenance and cure actions. 163 The court explained that punitive
damages were precluded because there was a "statutory/general
maritime law overlap," and in such cases, the guiding principle had
to be uniformity. 16 The court reasoned:
The analytical framework of Miles governs our approach
to deciding damages issues in general maritime actions....
The general maritime law will not expand the available
damages when Congress has spoken to the relief it deems
appropriate or inappropriate. ...
The Jones Act prohibits non-pecuniary recovery ....
Although the Miles Court did not mention punitive damages,
they are also rightfully classified as non-pecuniary.
Taking the analysis one step further, it should be clear
that actions under the general maritime law for personal
injury are also subject to the Miles uniformity principle, as
non-fatal actions for personal injury to a seamen are covered
by statute-i.e., the Jones Act. Thus, many courts have
extended Miles's logic to prohibit the recovery of certain
damages in personal injury factual settings that are covered
by statute, even when these personal injury claims are
brought under the general maritime law. ...
Because the tort-like maintenance and cure action involves
a personal injury. . . it overlaps with the personal injury
coverage of the Jones Act. . . . [O]nce there is a statutory/
general maritime law overlap in the factual circumstances
that are covered, the Miles damages uniformity principle is
invoked, and punitive damages would be precluded under
the general maritime action for maintenance and cure.
Based on this rationale, it should be clear that proving
even a willful denial of maintenance and cure cannot justify
an award of punitive damages after Miles. . . Under the
Miles uniformity principle, therefore, the same cause of
action under the general maritime law for the failure to pay
161. Id.
162. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995).
163. Id. at 1512-13.
164. Id. at 1512.
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maintenance and cure cannot provide a punitive recovery,
even if willfulness is demonstrated. 16 5
3. Cases Permitting the Recovery of Punitive Damages
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have all
declined to extend the Miles holding beyond the limited facts of that
case. 66 Accordingly, these Courts of Appeal have confined the pre-
clusion of punitive damages to claims by seamen against their Jones
Act employers. As a result of this narrow interpretation of Miles,
these courts have allowed the recovery of punitive damages in general
maritime law claims arising from an injury on the high seas or in
state territorial waters.
167
For example, in Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, 6 a pleasure
boat passenger was injured when she fell through an open man-hole
located in a walkway. 169 The passenger's husband filed a negligence
action under general maritime law seeking to recover non-pecuniary
damages for loss of society and consortium. 170 The United States
District Court for the District of Illinois explained that Miles was
intended to impose a uniform recovery scheme only in cases involving
DOHSA and the Jones Act. Because neither of these statutes were
at issue in Emery, the concern for uniform recovery did not exist. 17
165. Id. at 1506-13 (footnotes and citations omitted). In deciding the question, the
court reasoned that concern for uniformity of law outweighed the benefits of
the recovery of punitive damages in this class of cases. Id. at 1513. The court
reasoned: "[T]here is an established and continuing tradition of federal common
lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to
harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field .... [The Supreme
Court] counsels us to err on the side of 'harmonization' with the legislative
schemes, and that nudge towards harmony weighs in favor of prohibiting
punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases ... " Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
166. See Schumacher v. Cooper, 850 F. Supp. 438, 453-54 (D.S.C. 1994); Emery
v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 114, 117 (C.D. Ill. 1994); In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1084 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Mussa v. Cleveland Tankers, 802 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Duplantis v. Texaco, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 787, 788 (E.D. La. 1991).
167. E.g., Emery v. Rock Island Boat Works, 847 F. Supp. 114 (C.D. I1. 1994).
168. 847 F. Supp. 114 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
169. Id. at 115.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 118; see also Mussa, 802 F. Supp. at 87-88, in which the district court
permitted a seaman to assert a general maritime law claim seeking punitive
damages against a third party. Id. The defendant argued that Miles precluded
the recovery of punitive damages in all actions involving a Jones Act seaman
because of the need for uniform rules in maritime personal injury cases. Id.
at 85. The district court rejected this argument and held that the defendant
was seeking to apply Miles "in too broad a fashion." Id. The court found
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Therefore, the district court held that non-pecuniary damages were
available in actons under general maritime law.
17 2
IV. AN ORDERED RECOVERY SCHEME
The Miles decision was intended to eliminate inconsistent results.
It should follow that in the interest of fostering uniform substantive
law, punitive damages would be precluded in all maritime claims.
Based upon the manner in which the law is currently being applied,
however, any notion that Miles furthers uniformity is purely fiction.
The lower courts have based their decisions to allow the recovery
of punitive damages on the following distinctions: (1) the legal theory
of the claim, for example, claims brought under statutory as opposed
to general maritime theories, (2) the status of the plaintiff or the
decedent, for example, claims brought by a seaman as opposed to a
passenger, (3) the status of the party against whom the claim is
brought, for example, claims against the seaman's employer under
the Jones Act as opposed to a third party under general maritime
law, (4) the situs of the injury, for example, claims brought as a
result of a death or injury occurring in territorial waters as opposed
to on the high seas, and (5) the rights asserted, for example, claims
asserting survivor rights as opposed to wrongful death rights. The
courts that have refused to allow the recovery of punitive damages
have done so because they refuse to make such clumsy distinctions.
The result, of course, is inconsistent substantive law and recovery in
admiralty and maritime personal injury and death cases. This is
precisely what the Supreme Court counseled against in Miles.'73
Advocates for the elimination of punitive damage awards argue
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Miles precludes recovery of
punitive damages in causes of action created by the judiciary as well
as by statute. Miles unquestionably eliminates the availability of
punitive damages in actions arising out of the death of a seaman. It
would then follow, if the legal system has an interest in fostering
that the preclusion in Miles was limited to conforming general maritime law
claims with statutory actions asserted against the Jones Act employer. Id. at
85-86; see also Schumacher, 850 F. Supp. at 455 (allowing dependents of non-
seaman to recover non-pecuniary damages in personal injury negligence action);
Duplantis, 771 F. Supp. at 788 (allowing injured seaman to recover punitive
damages under general maritime law).
172. Emery, 847 F. Supp. at 118.
173. The conflict among the circuits may be the result of a change in the maritime
recovery scheme that Congress could not have anticipated. At the time Congress
passed the Jones Act and DOHSA, in 1920, wrongful death rights for claims
arising from deaths in state territorial waters were governed by state statutes.
Miles, 498 U.S. at 31. These state statutes limited the recovery to pecuniary
losses. Id. at 32.
Baltimore Law Review
uniform substantive law and an ordered system of recovery, that
punitive damages should also be barred in personal injury claims
arising from non-fatal injuries to seamen. Furthermore, because
recovery of punitive damages would not be available in claims arising
from the death or injury of seamen, it would be incongruous to
permit the recovery of punitive damages in actions arising from the
death or injury of non-seamen. Because Congress limited the scope
of recovery for tort claims under DOHSA and the Jones Act,
principles of uniformity require that recovery under the judicially
created maritime law injury and death actions be no greater than
recovery under maritime statutes.
Those who advocate limiting Miles to its facts and confining the
preclusion of punitive damages to claims arising out of the death of
a seaman argue against the arbitrary nature of maintaining uniformity
at all costs-each case should be assessed for its own merit. 174 This
approach, however, merely offers micro-interpretations of the mean-
ing of the Miles decision on a case by case basis. Caution should be
taken in limiting Miles to its facts. Those cases that have done so
are not based on superior reasoning that compels a restrictive reading
of the apparent intentions and implications of Miles.'75 The lower
courts have simply read Miles in a narrow manner so as not to
substantially preempt their interpretive discretion.
Uniformity remains a mantra in admiralty and maritime law.
1 76
The traditional notion of "uniformity" -is a venerable principle that
174. In Davis, 27 F.3d at 430, the Ninth Circuit succinctly rejected this argument:
The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish this case from Miles by stressing
that the defendant in this case is the shipbuilder, not a Jones Act
defendant. Yet there is nothing in Miles' [sic] reasoning to suggest
that the decision turned upon the identity of the defendant. Indeed,
not all the defendants in Miles were Jones Act employers. Moreover,
the principle underlying the Supreme Court's decision in both Miles
and Moragne is that general maritime law is intended to supplement
the statutory remedies created by Congress not to enhance or replace
them.
Id. at 430 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
175. The Supreme Court's decision in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S.
573 (1974), is often relied upon by courts to dismiss the assertion that maritime
law should strive to foster a uniform substantive law and an ordered system
of recovery. In Gaudet, the Court held that non-pecuniary damages for loss
of society were recoverable in a general maritime wrongful death action. Id.
at 587-88. In so doing, some argue that the Court recognized that it was
permitting recovery for damages that were not compensable under DOHSA
and the Jones Act. Id. at 588 n.22; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 622 (1978). But see Smallwood v. American Trading, 839 F. Supp.
1377, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding Gaudet damages unavailable for survivors
of longshore workers injured or killed in territorial waters).
176. See, e.g., DeSole v. United States, 947 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The tenets
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stems from the primary interest of admiralty and maritime law to
protect maritime commerce through uniform rules of decision. 177 The
traditional principle of uniformity was meant to eliminate the dis-
parities that would be caused by interjecting state law into maritime
law. 1
78
But a more modern concept has been grafted onto this traditional
notion of uniformity. The modern principle of uniformity, also
directed at fostering a uniform application of substantive law, was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines' 9 and was later refined by Miles. This modern principle of
uniformity supports the preclusion of punitive damages under general
maritime law and should now be utilized to restrict remedies available
under general maritime law in order to fashion an ordered system
of recovery that is in pari materia with the federal maritime statutes.
The Supreme Court's decision in Moragne exemplifies the fun-
damental principle that should guide any resolution of punitive
damages questions. In Moragne, the Supreme Court expanded general
maritime law in two ways so that it would conform to the recovery
scheme provided by federal maritime statutes for deaths on the high
seas. 0 First, the Court recognized an unseaworthiness cause of action
under general maritime law.' The court held that an unseaworthiness
action could be asserted in connection with claims arising from either
fatal or non-fatal injuries. Second, the Court recognized wrongful
of admiralty law, which are expressly designed to promote uniformity, do not
permit assumption of risk in cases of personal injury whether in commercial
or recreational situations."). Id. at 1174. Admiralty and maritime law, unlike
literature, do not embrace the virtues of uncertainty and unpredictability. See
Ronald Smothers, The Nobel Laureates on Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1995,
at C11 (eight nobel laureates in literature extol the virtues of uncertainty and
unpredictability in literature).
177. See Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1054 n.6
(1995); see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.3d
225 (1993).
178. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Supreme Court
stated: "That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the
United States cannot be doubted." Id. at 215. The Constitution refers to a
system of maritime law operating uniformly.
It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and
limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several
states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at
which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character
affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with foreign
states.
Id. Cases to the contrary interfere with the "proper harmony and uniformity"
of maritime law. Id. at 216.
179. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
180. Id. at 399-400.
181. Id. at 380-402.
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death rights under general maritime law. 8 2 The Court looked to the
legislative judgments behind the Jones Act and DOHSA and found
strong presumptions in favor of both a general maritime unseawor-
thiness action and wrongful death rights in claims arising from
incidents occurring in state territorial waters." 3 The result was not
only consistent with the general policies of the Jones Act and DOHSA
to favor wrongful death recovery, it also effectuated "constitutionally
based principles that federal admiralty law should be a uniform
system of law."'' 8 4 Although Moragne held that general maritime
causes of action should conform to the federal statutes, the case did
not specifically set forth the scope of damages recoverable under
general maritime law.
Miles, in which the Court created conformity between the Jones
Act and general maritime law recovery schemes," 5 represented a
decisive endorsement of the importance of achieving uniformity in
maritime law. The Supreme Court's language was not carelessly
chosen. The Supreme Court had begun to move towards fostering
uniform substantive law and recovery in maritime tort actions and
away from a scheme that fortuitously singled out for special com-
pensation any victim of wrongful conduct. The ratio decidendi of
Miles was to instill order into the recovery scheme by establishing a
policy of uniformity of damages under the Jones Act, DOHSA and
general maritime law claims. The rationale in Miles was stated in
terms broad enough to encompass claims brought under general
maritime law. Thus, uniformity sought by the Court in Miles is best
achieved by a rule that denies the recovery of punitive damages in
all maritime law injury and death claims.'
8 6
V. CONCLUSION
The lineal descendants of Miles serve only to reinforce the deep
conflict among the circuits. As the fissures regarding the preclusive
effect of Miles on the maritime law recovery scheme become more
182. Id.
183. Id. at 392.
184. Id.
185. Miles, 498 U.S. at 30.
186. It may be argued that, despite Moragne and Miles, the principle of uniformity
is insufficient to deny a plaintiff the recovery of punitive damages under general
maritime law. Relying on the well-intended desire to punish wanton and willful
conduct, this argument continues by asserting that these damages have a place
in tort law. These assertions require statements of the philosophy of tort law.
Whether criminal negligence should be addressed civilly or criminally is well
beyond the analysis here. In maritime law, the question is answered in terms
consistent with Congress's statement and judgment in DOHSA and the Jones
Act.
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pronounced, the Supreme Court will surely be called upon to create
uniform substantive law.' 87 When it is, the Court will have two,
narrow choices. The Court could either cleave to Miles and achieve
its goal of uniformity by precluding the recovery of punitive damages
in all maritime cases, or the Court could abandon its goal of
uniformity and limit Miles to its facts, thereby jettisoning it as an
exercise in legal fiction. Either way, it is time for the Court to state
with sufficient clarity whether punitive damages are recoverable under
general maritime law.
187. Since Miles, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in three cases presenting
the question of whether punitive damages are available under general maritime
law: Miller v. American President Lines Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1454 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993), Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4
F.3d 1084, 1094 (2d Cir. 1993), and Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So. 2d 921,
934-38 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
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